The short version
Deloitte’s figures for the 2024/25 season, reported on 18 August, show Premier League clubs posting combined pre-tax losses of £948 million — described as a roughly 600% deterioration year on year — with the number of clubs in operating profit falling from 13 to just 8 of 20. In the same week, Liverpool’s equity was priced at more than $7 billion in a minority sale. Both numbers are true. Understanding why they coexist is the key to understanding football finance in 2026.
The loss side of the ledger
The deterioration is structural, not accidental. Revenue across the league keeps growing, but wage bills and transfer-related costs grow faster, and the new Squad Cost Ratio (SCR) regime — fully in force from 2026-27 — has now made that gap a compliance problem rather than just an accounting one. When fewer than half the league’s clubs can produce an operating profit in a record-revenue era, the cost base, not the income statement’s top line, is the binding constraint. Every club CFO in the league now runs the same quarterly exercise: squad spend as a ratio of revenue, with little room for the year-end engineering that the old PSR system tolerated.
The valuation side of the ledger
And yet the assets reprice upward. Liverpool’s minority transaction valued the club above $7 billion (CNBC, 18 August) in the very week the league’s aggregate losses were published. The resolution of the paradox is that buyers are not purchasing next year’s profit. They are purchasing a scarce, supply-constrained claim on future broadcast and commercial cash flows, wrapped in a global brand. As the source analysis put it, the source of club value has shifted from annual earnings to the expected value of licensing the product — media rights, sponsorship inventory, global fan monetisation — over decades.
This is also why the market now supports so many entry structures: minority stakes with control options at Liverpool, a sovereign fund monetising a £350 million purchase into a £2 billion-plus valuation at Newcastle without selling, distressed entries after relegation at West Ham. The equity story and the P&L story have decoupled.
Why the paradox cannot run forever
A CFO’s caution: valuations capitalise expected cash flows. If the cost base keeps compounding faster than revenue — and if regulators (SCR domestically, UEFA’s squad cost rule in Europe, and now an Independent Football Regulator publishing structural warnings) keep tightening the link between the two — then the expectation embedded in today’s prices gets harder to underwrite. The IFR’s “State of the Game” work, covered later in this series, found 94% of English clubs loss-making. The paradox is stable only while media income keeps growing into the cost base.
What it means for Arsenal
Arsenal sit on the favourable side of both ledgers: a revenue base thick enough to generate SCR headroom, inside a league whose scarcity value keeps lifting the asset. The risk to monitor is not Arsenal’s own discipline but the league-wide one — if collective losses force harsher distribution or cost interventions, even well-run clubs feel the policy response.