The short version
Most “who owns Arsenal” pages stop at a name and a net-worth estimate. The balance sheet tells a more interesting story.
Since taking full control in 2018, Kroenke Sports & Entertainment (KSE) has run Arsenal as a lender, not a dividend-taker. KSE’s loans to the club grew from £202 million in 2021 — when they were used to redeem the stadium bonds — to £324 million by 2024 (Arsenal Supporters’ Trust analysis of the club’s accounts). In that period Arsenal have paid no dividend to their owner. Meanwhile the asset itself has roughly doubled in paper value since KSE bought out Alisher Usmanov in 2018 at a valuation of about £1.8 billion: Forbes’ 2025 list put Arsenal at $3.4 billion (≈£2.7 billion).
That combination — money in as debt, nothing out as dividends, value compounding on paper — is the actual Kroenke model. This article walks through it, number by number, from the club’s own accounts.
How KSE got to 100%
- 2007: Stan Kroenke buys his first stake (initially just under 10%).
- 2011: Kroenke becomes majority shareholder. His mandatory offer values the club at roughly £731 million.
- 2018: KSE buys Alisher Usmanov’s 30% stake for a reported £550 million, implying an equity value of about £1.8 billion, and takes Arsenal private at 100%.
Sources: club and stock-exchange announcements at the time; the 2018 Usmanov transaction was widely reported at £550m.
The relevant point for what follows: KSE’s total cash invested in buying the club was well under £1 billion for an asset now valued at $3.4 billion by Forbes. Everything since has been about how the club is financed, not bought.
The loans: from stadium bonds to owner debt
Arsenal’s original stadium debt — bonds issued to build the Emirates — was refinanced during the pandemic. The club’s accounts and analyses of them (Arsenal Supporters’ Trust; Swiss Ramble) show the sequence:
| Year (accounts to May) | KSE shareholder loans | What happened |
|---|---|---|
| 2021 | £202m | KSE loan used to redeem the stadium bonds; total club debt broadly unchanged at £218m |
| 2022 | £218m | Owner debt now the core of the balance sheet |
| 2023 | £259m | Loans rise as transfer spending accelerates |
| 2024 | £324m | Total debt £342m on the same analysis |
Source: Arsenal Supporters’ Trust financial reviews of Arsenal Holdings’ accounts, FY2021–FY2024; FY2021 refinancing per Swiss Ramble’s review of the FY2020/21 accounts. FY2025 loan balance not yet broken out in our data set.
Three things are worth understanding about this debt:
1. It replaced market debt with owner debt. The bonds carried strict covenants and a fixed repayment schedule. Owner loans are more flexible — no external creditor can call them in — which is precisely why they were used when COVID collapsed matchday revenue (Arsenal’s matchday income fell to £3.8 million in 2020/21).
2. It is not free money. Arsenal’s accounts carry real financing costs: net finance costs were £17.7 million in FY2025 (derived from the club’s published results: pre-tax loss of £1.4m, after £81.2m profit on player sales and an operating loss of £64.9m). The detailed terms of the KSE loans are not fully public, and we do not speculate on the rate here.
3. It sits alongside transfer debt. Separately from owner loans, Arsenal owed other clubs a net £275 million in staged transfer payments by FY2024 (AST analysis) — the instalment structure of the modern transfer market. The club also disclosed cash of £56.0 million at May 2025 and an undrawn £100 million working-capital facility with Barclays (club announcement).
The other side of the ledger: nothing out
The mirror image of the loans is what KSE has not taken.
- Dividends: none in the KSE era covered by the accounts we reviewed. This is a genuine point of contrast within the Premier League’s ownership landscape — most famously, Manchester United’s owners have taken regular dividends over the past decade.
- Management fees: the historical exception. Arsenal’s accounts in the mid-2010s showed payments of a reported £3 million a year to KSE for “strategic and advisory services” — a small sum that caused outsized controversy with supporters at the time. It is the only recurring owner extraction visible in the record, and it belongs to a much earlier chapter of the ownership.
The model, in other words, is not “put nothing in.” It is “put it in as loans, take nothing out, and let the asset appreciate.” Whether supporters judge that generously depends on the interest terms and on what the loans funded — increasingly, the squad: net transfer payables of £275 million by 2024 did not arise from a team standing still.
The asset: what is Arsenal worth now?
- Forbes (2025): $3.4 billion — eighth in world football.
- The 2018 benchmark: KSE’s buyout of Usmanov implied ≈£1.8 billion for 100%.
- The direction of travel: revenue has gone from £467 million (FY2023) to £691 million (FY2025) in two years, which is what ultimately supports the valuation.
A note on what a valuation is not: it is not cash, and it is not spendable under the squad cost rules. Forbes’ number capitalises the brand, the stadium, the league’s media rights and scarcity value. KSE can only realise it by selling — and there is no indication of that. What the rising valuation does do is make the owner-loan model rational from the owner’s side: £324 million of loans are secured, in economic substance, against an asset worth roughly ten times that.
Reported plans add one more capital question: Arsenal have been reported to be exploring an expansion of Emirates Stadium beyond its current ~60,700 capacity. No funding structure has been announced. If it proceeds, how it is financed — owner loans, external debt, or phased club cash flow — will be the next real test of the KSE model (reported, not confirmed by the club).
The verdict in one paragraph
KSE’s Arsenal is best understood as a portfolio asset run on conservative financial lines: full ownership since 2018, no dividends, owner loans that refinanced the stadium debt and then funded a squad rebuild, and a paper value that has roughly doubled since the buyout. The legitimate criticisms are about price (the interest terms are not public) and pace (the loans grew fastest when the team was already spending heavily), not about extraction. On the evidence of the accounts, the money has flowed in, not out.
FAQ
Does Kroenke put his own money into Arsenal? Yes, in the form of loans. KSE shareholder loans stood at £324 million in the FY2024 accounts analysis (Arsenal Supporters’ Trust). That is different from gifting equity: loans sit on the balance sheet as debt and carry financing costs.
Does Kroenke take dividends from Arsenal? No dividends have been paid in the period covered by the accounts reviewed here — a clear contrast with the Glazer-era Manchester United model.
How much is Arsenal worth? Forbes’ 2025 valuation put the club at $3.4 billion (≈£2.7 billion). KSE’s 2018 buyout of the remaining stake implied a value of about £1.8 billion.
What debt does Arsenal have besides the KSE loans? Mainly transfer instalments owed to other clubs — a net £275 million by FY2024 (AST analysis) — partly offset by cash (£56.0 million at May 2025) and an undrawn £100 million Barclays working-capital facility disclosed by the club.